ABSTRACT: This paper examines the implications of menu cost models for the rate of reversion to purchasing power parity. Recent menu cost models (Ball and Mankiw, 1994) imply that higher inflation is correlated with more rapid price adjustment. This means that reversion to PPP may be more rapid, the greater the rate of inflation. In order to test this proposition, PPI-deflated real exchange rates are examined to see if the rate of reversion to PPP is a function of inflation. Another implication, due to both Delgado (1991) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989) , is that higher exchange rate volatility is associated with slower rates of reversion. I find that both of these propositions hold in panel data, although the second proposition is less robust.
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Introduction
The issues of purchasing power parity (PPP), exchange rate pass-through and pricing-tomarket have occupied a large share of economists' attention over the past decade. The effort to detect PPP in goods prices has yielded some positive results recent years: Edison (1987) , Lothian and Taylor (1996) using long spans of data, MacDonald (1995) , Frankel and Rose (1996) and Wei and Parsley (1996) using panel data techniques. The half-life of a deviation from PPP has been variously estimated at between 3.5 to 5 years, for broad price indices, with the estimates tending toward the lower end when using indices of highly tradable goods, such as the producer price index (PPI). However, even with this established as a stylized fact, the mechanism by which prices adjust is still not well understood. In this paper, I examine the implications of some menu cost/near rationality models for the rate of reversion to PPP. Such models are associated with Mankiw (1985) and Akerlof and Yellen (1985) . The first such implication is that higher trend inflation rates, ceteris paribus, imply more rapid reversion to PPP; hence, unlike recent studies of nonlinear reversion, this paper relates the speed of adjustment to an observable macroeconomic variable. The second implication is that the higher the variance in random shocks to the exchange rate process, the slower the rate of reversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of recent developments in testing for purchasing power parity, and the dynamics of the real exchange rate.
Section 3 presents a simple menu-cost model of price adjustment, and examines its implications for the rate of reversion to PPP. Section 4 presents the econometric results for both time series regressions and panel regressions. Section 5 concludes.
To anticipate the results, I find that several implications of menu costs models are verified by the data for developed country currencies. The rate of reversion is more rapid when inflation is higher 1 . However, the volatility of oil prices and the volatility of exchange rates do
not appear to be substantial determinants of the rate of reversion.
Background
Purchasing Power Parity
This implies a different kind of nonlinearity behavior in the real exchange rate than that examined, for instance, by Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) who use a threshold autoregression model, motivated by a commodity points view of the world. Consider the standard model of purchasing power parity, as applied to tradable goods. A conventional approach is to consider the relationship between prices of goods expressed in a common currency, as in equation (1).
where p is the log price level, and s is the log exchange rate in domestic currency units per
foreign. An arbitrage argument is often proffered to explain why this relationshi p shou ld hol d: If the value of the left-hand side deviates from that of the right, then one can make excess profits by purchasing in one location, and selling in another.
Clearly, in the real world any number of factors can intrude upon this arbitrage process:
tariff and non-tariff barriers, regulatory restrictions, and transportation costs. Typically, it is assumed that even if PPP does not hold instantaneously, it does in the long run (see Froot and Rogoff, 1995, and Breuer 1994 for some further elaboration). Consequently, tests for PPP usually take the form of tests for mean reversion in the real exchange rate, using for instance the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression where Statistically significant detection of N < 0 in (2) indicates that in the long run PPP holds. The absolute value of N is the rate of reversion towards PPP.
With recent work on panel data indicating a finding of PPP (MacDonald, 1995; Wu, 1996) , sometimes even using broad price indices (Frankel and Rose, 1996) , one can now move to the more interesting economic question of the determinants of the ra te of rev ersion. Typically, researchers have motivated their allowance for slow adjustment on adjustment costs, or exogenously given sticky-prices.
Inflation and PPP
It is important to distinguish the hypotheses of interest here from others relating inflation to PPP. One piece of received wisdom is that when monetary shocks dominate, such as during hyperinflationary periods, then PPP will be easily detected; when inflation is low, then real shocks dominate, and PPP is difficult to find (Frenkel, 1978, McNown and Wallace, 1989) . One way of thinking about the traditional view is that there are two components to the real exchange rate: a random walk component and a transitory, mean reverting, component. Engel (2000) shows that when the transitory components variance is large relative to that of the permanent component, then the unit root null will be rejected even when it is true. It is plausible to think of this transitory component variance as larger when inflation is high.
In this paper, however, I examine exchange rates for 17 developed countries over the floating rate period, none of which can be considered in a hyperinflationary regime. 2 More importantly, the traditional view implies only that higher inflation implies easier detection of reversion, not faster reversion. However, a cursory glance at the data convinces one that higher It is well known that the inflationary experiences differ widely even over the set of developed countries, so it may be useful to view the correlations over two subsamples. Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of N 1 coefficients against inflation in the early period (1977.2-87.1), Figure   3 for the later (1987.2-96.2) . The pattern of correlation is negative in both sub-samples, so that the expected relationship holds. However, once again, neither relationship is statistically significant. The actual regression results are, for the early period:
and for the late:
(standard errors in parentheses). Ignoring for the moment statistical significance, consider the implications of these estimates. They indicate that in the early period, an increase in home and rest-of-world inflation from 0% to 10% induces an increase of the rate of reversion from 0.094 to 0.097 per quarter. In the later period, the implied effects are even more pronounced: the rate of reversion would rise from 0.108 to 0.252! The half life of a deviation from PPP would fall from six quarters to 2.4 quarters. Of course, the two standard error bounds easily encompass a zero coef ficient, so no effe ct on the rev ersion rate is just as likely.
It is possible that there are idiosyncratic, country-specific effects. To check this, I plot the change in the rates of reversion against the change in the average inflation rates from one period to another. This procedure yields figure 4.
There is essentially zero correlation.
Hence, the story is not as simple as one might think. Countries with high inflation tend to have insignificantly faster rates of reversion, implying slightly lower persistence in their real exchange rates, at least for inflation rates below 10%. Yet, microeconomic models of price stickiness, such as the menu cost model, imply that with higher secular inflation rates, adjustment of prices to optimal levels should be more rapid. In other words, the rate of reversion coefficients, and by extension the AR coefficients of real exchange rate autoregressions, should not be viewed as structural parameters, but rather functions of the inflation rate. 
Relation to Other Types of Nonlinearity
Recently Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) and Michael, Nobay and Peel (1997) have suggested that (3) only operates outside a certain band of inaction, caused by transport and other transactions costs. This "commodity points" (Obstfeld and Taylor) argument is analogous to the "gold points" bands of inaction prevailing during the gold standard. One difficulty of interpretation is that PPI baskets are being compared, rather than a homogeneous commodity like gold. Hence, the idea of a discrete band is more difficult to sustain. O'Connell (1998) argues that statistical findings of such "bands of inaction" are not robust, and that in fact the larger the deviations from PPP, the more persistent they are.
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Another interpretation of the market frictions/transport costs view is that firms adjust prices more rapidly the larger the deviations from the optima are. This view is consistent with Wei and Parsley's (1995) finding that a cubic term is important in explaining mean reversion for sectoral deflators in the OECD countries.
A final type of nonlinearity is implicit in the findings of Parsley (1995), Obstfeld and Taylor (1996) and Engel, Hendrickson and Rogers (1997) ; they conclude that the rates of reversion are lower the greater the geographic distance between the two relevant countries. A particularly illuminating scatterplot of rates of reversion and geographic distance is presented in (4) Campa and Wolf (1997) . The usual interpretation of this finding is that geographic distance proxies for economic distance, in terms of transportation costs. In the below analysis, I eschew examination of nonlinearities related to deviations from PPP, as well as those related to geographic distance, and focus on differentiating between the menu cost story and othres. That is, none of these other models has a role for inflations, so that this variable should not be empirically relevant in the data..
Menu Costs and PPP
Menu Costs in the Closed Economy
In order to examine the role of menu costs in determining the rate of reversion to PPP, I
first discuss their implications in a closed economy setting, as described in Ball and Mankiw (1994) . The model incorporates a combination of state-contingent and time-contingent price adjustment. Some degree of time-contingent adjustment is necessary for the model to exhibit monetary non-neutrality .
In this partial equilibrium model, firms set nominal prices on even periods. Firms can change prices on odd periods only by incurring a menu cost of C. The one-period loss function for firm i is gi ven by:
where p i is the optimal log nominal price for firm i, and D is a dummy variable indicating when prices are changed during an odd period. The minimization of a quadratic loss function can be interpreted as a second order approximation to the maximization of a general profit function of a monopolistically competitive firm.
The firm's relative price is 2 i ; hence the optimal nominal price is given by p i / p + 0 -i Let the subscript denote prices at the beginning of periods. Initial equilibrium is assumed to be given by p 0 = 0, and 0 -0 i . The firm must decide what the optimal price to set for the next two periods is, given some uncertainty regarding the optimal relative price at the end of period 0. Assuming that the secular inflation rate over the two periods is B, the optimal price for the firm to set beginning in period 0, and extending to the end of period 1, is B/2, given the quadratic loss function. That is, the price set for the two periods is the average of the initial and terminal price levels. Now suppose that after the firm has set the price in period 0 at B/2, there is a relative price shock, such that the 0 -1 i = / 0. The firm must then decide at the beginning of period 1 whether to change the nominal price to p 1 i . To determine the firm's choice, consider the period 1 loss function under the two options (the period 0 losses are the same, irrespective of the choice):
For a given positive 0 -1 i and menu cost C, the decision rule is to adjust if C > (B/2 + 0 -1 i ) 2 . The comparative statics are quite straightforward. The greater the rate of inflation, the lower the menu costs, or the larger 2 i , the more likely the firm will adjust the price level.
Menu Costs and Adjustments to PPP
To where s is the spot exchange rate.
In the absence of relative price shocks, the presence of anticipated secular inflation does not affect this relationship; assume inflation at home is B and in the foreign country is B*. The rate of change of the spot exchange rate is B-B*. Notice that if deviations from PPP are due to pricing-to-market, inflation should have no effect on the rate of reversion (assuming constant elasticity of the demand curves). Hence, evidence of an independent effect of inflation provides evidence in support of a menu cost model, although it does not disprove the pricing-to-market model. (For a closer examination of this issue, see Ghosh and Wolf, 1994) .
In this clearly partial-equilibrium framework, there is no feedback from relative prices to the nominal exchange rate, or to the secular inflation rate in this model. PPP is re-asserted by movements in prices, rather than the exchange rate. While in principle, a parity condition makes no statement as to the direction of causality, empirical evidence tends to support the view that
most adjustment toward PPP for floating exchange rates takes place via movements in prices. 
Implications for PPP Equations
Ball and Mankiw (1994) predict in a menu cost model with a distribution of money and sectoral shocks that price adjustment will be more rapid the greater the deviation from zero secular inflation. Hence, one would expect more rapid adjustment to re-assert PPP if either inflation is very positive, or very negative, holding everything else constant. However, this ceteris paribus assumption is difficult to maintain for the sample period under investigation.
High inflation in their model is also correlated with sectoral shocks and changes in relative prices, which could in principle make PPP hold less well.
This model suggests that the parameter N depends positively on both home country and foreign country inflation, holding sectoral shocks constant. Hence, I estimate regressions of the form:
where B is an inflation rate, and z is a measure of exogenous sectoral price dispersion. I take the simplest parameterization for the N function, and use as a proxy for z the absolute value of the percent change in oil prices, This implies that the following parametric representation of (5):
One might make the argument that any role for inflation so detected might be a statistical artifact.
For instance, note that:
but the log price changes are the same as the inflation rate, so that in regressing the change of the real exchange rate on an inflation term, one will necessarily obtain a significant coefficient. First, to proxy secular inflation, I will use lagged CPI inflation for the previous year, while the real exchange rate will be defined using the PPI. Second, the regression incorporates lagged (not contemporaneous) inflation interacted with the lagged dependent variable.
Formally, the rate of reversion and hence N should be related to |B+B * |. Since inflation is positive for most of the sample period, it is not possible to differentiate between the hypothesis that |B+B * | and the hypothesis that B+B * matters. The view that the latter variable is important is consistent with models of downwardly rigid prices, such as recently exposited by Akerlof,
Dickens and Perry (1997).
Menu costs and their effects could also be modeled in a different manner. Delgado (1992) has derived a continuous-time model wherein menu costs are proportional to the price change.
The rationale for this specification is that changes in costs incur consumer resentment. When the firm's decisions are modeled in an intertemporal framework, there is an option value to waiting to change prices. The likelihood that a single firm changes its price (and hence, in the aggregate, the rate of reversion of the overall price level) rises with the underlying volatility of the exchange rate process and falls with the magnitude of menu costs. At the limit, when menu costs are a zero proportion of the price change, then all nonlinearities disappear. This model suggests augmenting (7) with a exchange rate volatility term:
This specification is also consistent with one interpretation of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989) .
They show that risk-averse firms will tend to adjust prices less than quantities if there is greater uncertainty regarding outcomes of pricing decisions on profits. The fact that trade flows seem to be uncorrelated with rates of reversion suggests that firms do indeed tend to adjust quantities rather than prices in international trade (Campa and Wolf, 1997) .
Econometric Analysis
Data
Exchange rates and inflation rates: The multilateral real exchange rate series is used.
They are the IMF' s trade-weighted exchange rates, expressed relative to 17 other industrialized economies. The domestic inflation rate is calculated as the first difference of log CPIs, annualized. In the multilateral regressions, the "foreign" inflation rate is a weighted average of the other 16 country's inflation rates, using (proportionally) the same trade weights used in calculating the exchange rates.
Sectoral shocks: Without detailed information on sectoral shocks, it is a difficult to test the proposition that inflation rates affect the reversion coefficient, holding all else constant. One potential measure would be the within period variance of prices, although this variable might suffer from endogeneity problems (inflation might cause price dispersion, rather than vice versa).
I resort to the macroeconomist's favorite proxy for supply shocks, the price of oil in US dollars per barrel, deflated by the US CPI. The exogenous dispersion in relative prices is then the absolute value of the first log difference of this variable.
Volatility: The ideal measure is the conditional variance of the fundamental shock impinging upon the nominal exchange rate process. In the absence of this variable, I use the absolute value of the first difference of the log nominal exchange rate. This selection is consistent with the hypothesis of no mean reversion in the nominal exchange rate. At the quarterly frequency under study here, the assumption undertaken is probably not a bad approximation.
Further description of the data is contained in the Data Appendix.
Preliminary Data Analysis
The results of estimating equation (2) on multilateral real exchange rates are reported in Table 1 . Panel 1 reports estimates for the PPI deflated real exchange rates, Panel 2 those for the export unit value deflated rates, and Panel 3 those for the manufacturing value added deflator defined rates. The lag length is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for up to 8 lags. Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller critical values, the unit root null can be rejected for nine currencies, out of the seventeen currencies: the Canadian dollar, Italian lire, UK pound, Belgian franc, Finish markka, Irish punt, Norwegian krone, Swedish kroner, and Swiss franc. Using a 10% MSL, one would expect about 2 rejections just by pure chance, so there does seem to be substantial evidence of mean reversion in PPI deflated real exchange rates. In some senses, this result is fairly surprising, given our knowledge of the low power of unit root tests; on the other hand, on a theoretical basis, we know that PPIs measure highly tradable goods so this is one real exchange rate that should evidence mean reversion.
The results for Panels 2 and 3 are much less promising. Both the export unit value deflated and value added deflator defined real exchange rates fail to reject the unit root null except in two cases (German mark and Finnish markka in Panel 2, and Canadian dollar and Belgian franc in Panel 3). Hence, the subsequent analysis will be conducted using the PPI deflated real exchange rate.
Panel Regression Results
The panel regression results for a simple ADF regression as a baseline are reported in Table 2 . Estimation is conducted using OLS with fixed effects, and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) with fixed effects. Estimates are provided for full sample, G-7 currencies and non-G-7 (or minor) currencies. 7 The point estimate for the rate of reversion is statistically significant, using the Levin and Lin (1992) critical values, and range from 7.9% to 8.7% per quarter. The implied half-life is approximately 2 years, slightly under other estimates for CPI deflated real exchange rates. The estimates for the G-7 currencies and are slightly lower, and those for the minor currencies slightly higher, than these overall estimates. The SUR estimate for the G-7 implies a half life of 8.8 quarters, while the OLS estimate for the minor implies a half life of about 5.5 quarters.
In Table 3 , I augment the specification with inflation and oil price variability terms. For the whole sample, the SUR estimate of the rate of reversion is largely unchanged. The point estimate on the inflation interaction term is such that a 20% increase in the two-country summed inflation induces a .0002 increase in the rate of reversion, which is economically miniscule. The half life of a deviation drops from 6.7 quarters to 6.68 quarters. Even this effect is not detected in either of the subsamples. Nor does the oil price variability term enter in with any significance (although it always slows down the rate of reversion as anticipated).
In Table 4 , I replace the oil price variability term with an exchange rate volatility term.
For the entire sample, once again, the the SUR estiamtes indicate a role for inflation. Yet the effect is of the same magnitude --the half life of a deviation is reduced by about a fifth of a quarter. This effect is not detected in either of the subsamples.
The exchange rate volatility variable comes in with significance only in one specification --the SUR estimates for the G-7. This point estimate indicates a 10% increase in last period's nominal exchange rate volatility increases the rate of reversion by .0018. One interpretation of this result is that lagged exchange rate volatility does not proxy for exchange rate uncertainty, but rather measures the resolution of deviations from PPP.
Conclusions
This paper has drawn out a number of implications of menu cost models of price adjustment. The Ball-Mankiw formulation implies that higher inflation is associated with more rapid price adjustment. Assuming that firms seek to set the relative price of individual goods at the same level as that of a foreign country' s firm, producing the same (but differentiated) good, then deviations from purchasing power parity will tend to disappear more rapidly with higher secular inflation.
The data are broadly consistent with this finding, although the cross-section/time-series evidence on the posited effect is quite weak. Only when appealing to the cross section data does the positive relationship between reversion rates and inflation appear. Finally, the relationship between volatility and reversion rates is negative, but usually statistically insignificant.
Further research will need to examine the results when a larger number of currencies are examined. The robustness of the results will also have to be evaluated in terms of deflators, regression specifications and estimation techniques.
One particularly promising avenue of research would involve investigating differences in reversion along the dimension of sectors. For instance, one might think that reversion would be slower in sectors characterized by highly differentiated goods. This avenue is investigated in Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2001) .
Data Appendix
Data is from IMF, International Financial Statistics, March 1997 CD-ROM.
The nominal exchange rate is period average, IFS line rf, in US$/foreign currency unit.
Producer price index, IFS line 63, 1990 = 100 (period average).
The multilateral real exchange is IFS line 63ey, trade-weighted PPI-deflated real exchange rate, defined against 17 other industrialized countries.
Inflation is 4-quarter difference of log(CPI) (in decimal terms). 
